

EXHIBIT NO. 154

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL ARNOLD AND GENERAL MARTIN

Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin (1941)

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1]

15 AUGUST 1941.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. A.
*Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
 Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR GENERAL ARNOLD: There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the Secretary of the General Staff was received requesting that "a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii."

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as Commanding Officer of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain Codrington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a statement which can not be fully realized upon to say that, "The defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment airplanes which are setup for this mission by this study." That being true, then, by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of airplanes and the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department nor the Army Air Force further concern.

The original of this report is being forwarded through the Department Commander of the Hawaiian Department but I am sending you a copy direct so that you may have an opportunity to consider this study prior to the original arriving in the War Department.

Most sincerely,

(S) F. L. Martin,
 F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.

[2]

20 AUGUST 1941.

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.
 To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
 Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan).

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is [3] considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands-----	2
Morse Field-----	2
Hilo-----	1
Lanai-----	1
Parker Ranch-----	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

[4] 10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls—

Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate).

Incl #2—Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).

Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate).

[NOTE.—For inclosures see Army Exhibit 35, Roberts Record.]

[5] Basic: (Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.")
AG 381/264 HDP

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

/S/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls. (dup).

[6] SEPTEMBER 25, 1941.
Major General F. L. MARTIN,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MARTIN: There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operative Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effectiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps and related troops.

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except under most unusual circumstances.

It would seem that the proper step to be taken would be a request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial and informal comment.

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

[7]

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD,
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HAPPY: In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted.

During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12-24 May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed they could assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel for ground defense missions. This letter directed that—

a. *At Hickam Field*: The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform the following missions:

(1) One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.

(2) One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OHD 38.

[8] b. *At Wheeler Field*: The training of one battalion of 500 men to perform the following missions:

(1) Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.

(2) Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofield Area now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OD 40.

The training of these 1,500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry instructors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week. The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3:00 p. m. to 4:30 p. m. interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defensive positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for carrying-on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still carrying-on its primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941, was prepared on this subject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infantry and to take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.

A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry missions, other than that Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure", that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Procedure" had been changed as indicated above.

[9] It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training, dated August 25, 1941.

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no enemy in these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect a landing on these shores.

I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, assuming that the Hawaiian Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military man power available to him in carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force and realized its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper training for their normal mission.

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Policy Company to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These services can never be efficiently performed except by those who are regularly and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to [10] the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbearable, bring it to your personal attention.

I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian Air Force. As you will observe tables of organizations for the respective units have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experiences indicates the num-

ber of men in these organizations barely meets the demands on this personnel for our operations.

Expressing to you my high esteem I beg to remain,

Most sincerely,

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.

1 Incl.

Cy. ltr. fr. HAF, to CG HD,
8/25/41

Nov. 27, 1941.

[11]

Major General F. L. MARTIN,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
Hickam Field, T. H.

DEAR FRED: Your letter of November 3, 1941, was very enlightening on the use of Air Force troops in Hawaii. I am happy to learn that in your opinion a satisfactory solution to the problem will be arrived at shortly.

When the new "Standing Operating Procedure" of the Hawaiian Department is published, I would be interested in knowing the policy which it expresses toward air troops and their employment in local defense of air bases. These matters are of vital interest and the decisions reached in Hawaii may aid in the solutions of similar situations in the United States or in other theaters.

In your letter you urged that a War Department policy be issued which will prescribe that ground forces assume the responsibility of airdrome defense. The broad policy governing local ground defense of air bases has been published in War Department Training Circular No. 47, dated July 18, 1941. Paragraph 16 of this circular states the order of availability of troops for defense, and Air Corps troops are listed in the 4th priority with a notation that their primary mission is operation, maintenance and repair of aircraft. I believe that this is a plain statement of current War Department policy on this matter.

I am appreciative of your efforts to keep me abreast of developments affecting your command.

Yours very truly,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

EXHIBIT NO. 155

(Exhibit 155 is the original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, December 7, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Item No. 88 in Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)